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Abstract 
Research reveals that the ego- and time-moving representations, two divergent ways to talk 
and think about time, are psychologically meaningful: they are, for example, linked to agency. 
This research has, however, mainly been correlational in nature and only been conducted 
amongst English speakers, even though cross-linguistic differences are readily observed in 
research on time representation. The present research addresses these limitations. In the first 
study, we explore the causal relation amongst English speakers and show that feelings of 
personal agency lead to the adoption of the ego-moving representation. In the second and 
third study, we replicate the first study and conduct a correlational study amongst Dutch 
speakers. We find no proof for a similar relation between agency and time representation 
amongst Dutch speakers. In discussing the findings, the role language plays in shaping 
preferences is considered as well as the methodological issues that need to be addressed by 
future research.  
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Dwelling on past events and anticipating hypothetical future events are prominent activities of 
the human mind (Spronken, Holland, Figner, & Dijksterhuis, 2016). When talking about such 
events to others, people heavily rely on spatial terms to get their message across: we say a 
meeting was short, that a deadline is approaching, that we are ahead of our time, and that we 
are leaving bad days behind and looking forward towards a bright future. Research on 
understanding the representation of time has shown that this way of talking about time is 
reflective of the way time is cognitively represented (Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto, Fotakopoulou, & Boroditsky, 2010; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013). 
As time cannot be experienced directly through the senses, people rely on spatial metaphors to 
understand and talk about time (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  
A considerable amount of research has focused on contrasting two spatial metaphors, 
two specific ways of representing time spatially: the ego- and the time-moving representation 
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Duffy & Feist, 2014; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; McGlone & 
Harding, 1998; McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Richmond, Wilson, & Zinken, 2012). In the ego-
moving representation, people see themselves moving through a temporal landscape, 
approaching future events whilst leaving past events behind. In contrast, in the time-moving 
representation, future temporal events approach and pass a stationary ego, as they change 
from events in the future to events in the past. Do these different ways of thinking and talking 
about time reveal anything about the way people feel and act towards the past and future 
events they so often think and talk about? The current research addresses this by investigating 
whether feelings of personal agency, the amount of control one perceives over life events, 
affects our representation of time. Specifically, we tested whether personal agency leads to the 
adoption of the ego-moving representation, where the person is the agentic entity moving 
towards future temporal events, and whether lack of personal agency leads to the adoption of 
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the time-moving representation, where the person is stationary, being approached by future 
temporal events. 
 The idea that agency and time representation might be linked in such a way is 
corroborated by various studies. Indirect support for the link between agency and time 
representation, for example, comes from the work by McGlone and Pfiester (2009) and 
Ruscher (2011). Building on research linking agency to positive affect through an approach 
motivation (Higgins, 1997; Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, de Houwer, & de Raedt, 2010; Margolies 
& Crawford, 2008), they point out the inherent differences in the way that agency is assigned 
in ego- and time-moving expressions (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Ruscher, 2011). Agency is 
often inexplicitly communicated through certain linguistic constructions with greater agency 
assigned to grammatical subjects than to objects (Henley, Miller, & Beazley, 1995; McGlone 
& Pfiester, 2009; Ruscher, 2011; van Dijk, 1988; see also Fausey & Boroditsky, 2010, 2011). 
In ego-moving expressions, the grammatical subject features the person (e.g., We passed the 
deadline) whilst in time-moving expressions the person is usually in the object role with the 
grammatical subject role featuring the temporal event (e.g., The deadline passed us).  
 McGlone and Pfiester (2009) analyzed English corpora and found that when 
describing positive events, people more often employed ego-moving expressions than time-
moving expressions; when describing negative events, people more often employed time-
moving expressions than ego-moving expressions. In follow-up studies, they found similar 
results when eliciting narratives about either positive or negative events from participants and 
when asking participants to indicate the affective orientation of someone described in a 
vignette using either ego- or time-moving expressions (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009). Ruscher's 
(2011) findings extend this by showing a relation between time representation and affective 
forecasting: participants who read a vignette about a grieving mother after being primed with 
an ego-moving representation, estimated shorter grieving periods and provided agentic 
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comments about a return to daily routines (as opposed to comments about the passive passage 
of negative affect), compared to participants who received a time-moving prime.  
The link between the ego-moving representation and an approach motivation (and by 
extension thus agency) is further corroborated by findings of Hauser, Carter, and Meier 
(2009) who showed that anger, which is an approach emotion, is linked to an ego-moving 
representation. In addition, Duffy and Feist (2014) found that students, compared to 
professional administrators, were more likely to adopt an ego-moving representation. They 
explained their findings as being due to the different relation these two populations have with 
time: where students are generally in control of structuring their time, administrators are 
controlled by time, in the sense that their days are more structured by external demands 
(Duffy & Feist, 2014).   
More direct support for the hypothesized relation between agency and time 
representation is found in a recent study by Richmond et al. (2012). They report that 
happiness, higher levels of personal agency, and a future orientation were positively related to 
an ego-moving representation (Richmond et al., 2012). Depression, anxiety, lower levels of 
agency, a fatalistic and hedonistic time orientation, were, in turn, related to a time-moving 
representation (Richmond et al., 2012).  
In the study most relevant to the current study, Richmond et al. (2012) measured 
personal agency using the Behavioral Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The 
Behavioral Identification Form provides participants with 25 behaviors or actions (e.g., taking 
a test) and asks them to choose between two descriptions that identify the actions at different 
levels. One description focuses on the motives and meaning of the behavior (e.g., showing 
one’s knowledge) where the other description focuses on the details and methods (e.g., 
answering questions) (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1989). According to Vallacher and Wegner 
(1989; see also Richmond et al., 2012) agentic individuals incorporate the motives and 
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meaning in their actions whereas those with lower levels of personal agency will focus on the 
details and methods. The results of the study showed that participants who adopted an ego-
moving representation, as opposed to a time-moving representation, scored higher on the 
Behavior Identification Form (Richmond et al., 2012).  
In the first study reported in the current research, we build on this correlational 
research and extend it by manipulating agency amongst participants to test whether feelings of 
personal agency lead to the adoption of an ego-moving representation as opposed to a time-
moving representation. In doing so, we take a first step in investigating the possible causal 
mechanism underlying this relation.    
Another aim of the current study was to extend prior research on agency and time 
representation by investigating the relation between the two amongst a non-English-speaking 
sample. Namely, all the above studies providing indirect and direct support for the relation 
between agency and time representation have exclusively been conducted amongst English-
speaking participants. Yet, a vast body of research shows that time representation is heavily 
influenced by linguistic and/or cultural factors (Bender, Beller, & Bennardo, 2010; 
Boroditsky, Fuhrman, & McCormick, 2011; Dahl, 1995; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Lai & 
Boroditsky, 2013; Moore, 2011; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; Rothe-Wulf, Beller, & Bender, 
2015; see Bender & Beller, 2014 for a discussion). Specifically, in relation to the ego- and 
time-moving representation, researchers have found that speakers of other languages, like 
Malagasy, Mandarin, German, and Swedish, have a strong preference for one representation 
over the other: Malagasy, Mandarin, and German speakers all seem to prefer the time-moving 
representation whilst Swedish speakers seem to prefer the ego-moving representation (Bender 
et al., 2010; Dahl, 1995; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Rothe-Wulf et al., 2015). This strong 
preference for one representation over the other cannot be observed amongst English 
speakers: studies generally report that about half of the English-speaking participants use an 
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ego-moving representation whereas the other half uses a time-moving representation (Lai & 
Boroditsky, 2013; Richmond et al., 2012; Rothe-Wulf et al., 2015).  
If language indeed plays such a vital role in shaping our time representation, the 
question of whether previous documented relations between time representation and 
psychological constructs such as agency amongst speakers of English generalize to other 
languages becomes pertinent. The second and third study reported in this research address this 
question by investigating the relation between agency and time representation amongst non-
English-speaking participants. Study 2 replicates our first experimental study and manipulates 
agency between participants in a Dutch-speaking sample. Study 3 more closely follows 
Richmond et al.’s (2012) study design in taking a non-experimental approach to investigate 
whether the adoption of either the ego- or time-moving representation is related to increased 
and decreased feelings of personal agency in speakers of Dutch, respectively.  
Although research on time representation amongst Dutch speakers is almost non-
existent, Dutch speakers are well suited to examine the relation between agency and time 
representation on, as both representations can be employed to talk about temporal events: like 
in English, in Dutch one can say that the deadline is approaching (de deadline nadert) or that 
we are approaching the deadline (wij naderen de deadline). Moreover, previous research has 
indicated that the ambiguous time question, a question used almost exclusively by researchers 
to gauge the ego-moving and time-moving representation, is ambiguous to speakers of Dutch 
(Elvevåg, Helsen, De Hert, Sweers, & Storms, 2011). This allows us to test the relation 
between agency and the ego- and time-moving representation amongst a different population 
using the same measures as used in prior studies with English-speaking participants.  
 
Study 1 
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Study 1 manipulates feelings of personal agency between English-speaking participants to test 
the causal relation between agency and time representation. This study thus extends previous 
studies using a correlational approach, which, for example, used the Behavioral Identification 
Form as proxy measures for agency (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Richmond et al., 2012). We 
follow previous studies in using time representation questions to gauge the ego and time-
moving representation (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Margolies & Crawford, 2008; McGlone & 
Harding, 1998; Richmond et al., 2012) and hypothesize that feelings of personal agency, 
compared to lack of personal agency, lead to the adoption of an ego-moving representation 
when answering these questions. 
  
Method 
Participants and Design. One-hundred sixty-four participants (74 males; 90 females) with an 
average age of 36.32 years (SDage = 11.73), recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, took 
part in the study. We only accepted ‘Turkers’ who were located in the US and with an 85% or 
higher approval rate to ensure high quality participants in our sample. Most participants 
(75.6%) identified as having European American heritage. We only included the 159 
participants (97%) who indicated English as their mother tongue for the analyses. One 
participant was removed from the analyses because he/she provided nonsensical answers, 
leaving us with a sample of 158 participants. On average, participants took about 20 minutes 
to complete the entire study and were given monetary compensation in exchange for their 
participation. They were randomly assigned to either the high personal agency or low 
personal agency condition.  
 
Materials and Procedure. An explanation of the procedure was given before participants were 
asked to indicate their willingness to participate. To manipulate agency between participants 
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we used Fisher and Johnston's (1996) autobiographical recall task. Participants in the high 
personal agency condition were asked to recall and describe three situations in which they 
were in control; participants in the low personal agency condition were asked to recall and 
describe three situations in which they had not been in control. This recall task was effectively 
used by Fisher and Johnston (1996) to manipulate perceived control and also by Ottley, 
Crouser, Ziemkiewicz, and Chang (2015) in their online study using participants recruited via 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Directly after the agency manipulation we gauged time representation using two 
measures. The first measure consisted of two ambiguous time questions: Next week 
Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward 2 days. What day is the meeting now that it 
has been rescheduled? and Tomorrow’s 12:00 p.m. (noon) meeting has been moved forward 2 
hours. What time is the meeting now that it has been rescheduled? (Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; 
Margolies & Crawford, 2008; McGlone & Harding, 1998; Richmond et al., 2012). If 
participants rely on an ego-moving time representation, see themselves as moving forward, 
moving a meeting forward would denote moving it to a later point in time, in the direction of 
the movement, thus from Wednesday to Friday or from 12:00 p.m. to 02:00 p.m. If, however, 
participants take a time-moving time representation, see temporal events as approaching them 
and sweeping past them, moving a meeting forward would denote moving to an earlier point 
in time, in the direction of the movement, thus from Wednesday to Monday or from 12:00 
p.m. to 10:00 a.m. We randomized the order of the two ambiguous time questions.  
The second measure consisted of a question that asked participants to choose between 
an ego-moving statement (I am approaching the meeting) and a time-moving statement (The 
meeting is approaching me; Hauser et al., 2009; Margolies & Crawford, 2008; Richmond et 
al., 2012). Participants were asked to pick the statement that best expressed how they felt. The 
order in which the two statements were presented was randomized across participants.  
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 After the time representation measure, participants filled in questions unrelated to the 
purpose of this study. They filled in demographic information before being debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.1  
 
Results 
We first looked at the descriptions participants provided in response to Fisher and Johnston's 
(1996) autobiographical recall task. Within the high personal agency condition, participants 
typically provided a description of achieving a personal or professional goal through 
deliberate action on their part or of a period in their lives during which they had felt they were 
in control of the future. For example, in the high personal agency condition, one participant 
described achieving the weight loss that he or she desired: When I lost 15 pounds using weight 
watchers. It is something that I really wanted to do and I achieved that goal. Another 
participant described the period during which he or she was a quarterback: I felt in control 
when I was younger playing quarterback for my football team. I called the plays, I always had 
the ball, and I was the decision maker. Of course, all of the blame could be placed on me as 
well so it was a give and take situation. I liked his position and I cannot say any bad things 
about being a quarterback of a football team. I felt that I had a lot of control in these 
situations and I was proud of myself. When I did wrong I needed to own up to my 
misjudgments. When I did well people [praised] me.  
In the low personal agency condition, participants typically provided a description of a 
situation in which some event outside of their control had happened and affected them in 
some way or a situation in which the outcome of something was outside of their control. For 
example, in the low personal agency condition, one participant described a situation in which 
their car broke down: My car [would not] start and I had no idea how to get it started. I didn't 
think it was the battery because the battery hadn't been giving me trouble in the past. The car 
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had plenty of gas in it as it had a full tank. I called my insurance agent to see if [they] could 
send someone out to fix the car but they could only send a tow truck. I called multiple friends 
and no one had a clue on why the car wouldn't start. A friend eventually came over and used 
jumper cables on it and it started it up just fine. 
We then looked at the responses participants gave to the time representation questions. 
In regards to the ambiguous time questions, ten participants provided inconsistent answers (an 
ego-moving answer to one ambiguous time question and a time-moving answer to the other 
ambiguous time question) or incorrect answers (e.g. Saturday). As it was not clear which 
representation these ten participants used, they were excluded from further analyses. One 
participant specifically commented on the ambiguous nature of the time questions and was 
also excluded from the analyses. Of the remaining 147 participants, the majority of 
participants (60.5%) provided an ego-moving consistent answer (Friday and 02:00 p.m.) in 
response to both ambiguous time questions, whilst a minority (39.5%) provided a time-
moving consistent answer (Monday and 10:00 a.m.). In regards to Margolies and Crawford’s 
(2008) statement question, the majority of participants (62.6%) chose the ego-moving 
statement (I am approaching the meeting); whilst a minority (37.4%) chose the time-moving 
statement (The meeting is approaching). A chi-square analysis indicated that answers to the 
ambiguous time questions and Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement question were not 
significantly related, Χ2 (1, N = 147) = 1.324, p = .296 (please note that for all analyses in this 
paper, the chi-square value reported is the exact value and the associated p value reported is 
two-sided). 
We examined the effect of agency on the two ambiguous time questions using a chi-
square analysis. In line with our expectations, this chi-square analysis revealed that 
participants in the high personal agency condition, compared to participants in the low 
personal agency condition, were significantly more likely to provide an ego-moving 
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consistent answer than a time-moving consistent answer, Χ2 (1, N = 147) = 5.249, p = .028 
(see Table 1). 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
---------------------------- 
We then analyzed the responses participants gave to Margolies and Crawford's (2008) 
statement question. A chi-square analysis revealed a non-significant effect of agency on the 
statement chosen: participants in the high personal agency condition, compared to 
participants in the low personal agency condition, were not significantly more likely to 
choose the ego-moving statement (I am approaching the meeting) over the time-moving 
statement (The meeting is approaching), Χ2 (1, N = 147) = .556, p = .497 (see Table 2). 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 
---------------------------- 
 Following Dienes' (2014) recommendations, we performed Bayesian analyses in order 
to report Bayes factors. We tested the effect of agency on the ambiguous time question and 
statement (2008) question using the statistical software JASP. Bayesian Contingency Tables 
Tests showed that in regards to the ambiguous time question, the BF10 was 2.69, indicating 
that the data we observed were 2.69 more likely under the alternative hypothesis than the null 
hypothesis; in regards to Margolies and Crawford's (2008) statement question, the BF01 was 
3.62, indicating that the data we observed were 3.62 more likely under the null hypothesis 
than the alternative hypothesis.   
 
Discussion 
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In Study 1, feelings of personal agency led to the adoption of an ego-moving representation as 
opposed to a time-moving representation, as measured by the ambiguous time question. Even 
though our Bayesian analyses indicate our data only provide ‘anecdotal’ evidence in favor for 
an effect of agency on the ambiguous time questions (Jeffreys, 1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 
2014), it does corroborate previous correlational findings (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; 
Richmond et al., 2012).  
Interestingly, proof for such a relation was not found when measuring time 
representation with Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement question. Richmond et al. 
(2012) did find that answers to Margolies and Crawford's (2008) statement question were 
related to agency, as measured by the Behavior Identification Form. A possible explanation 
for the discrepancy between the two measures and the way they relate to agency might be 
found when looking at Margolies and Crawford's (2008) own research and the research by 
Hauser et al. (2009). They found that their independent variables, event valence and anger, 
also affected the ambiguous time questions and the statement question differently (Hauser et 
al., 2009; Margolies & Crawford, 2008). In discussing their findings, both suggest that it 
might be due to the fact that having an enthusiasm- or angry-invoking event might counteract 
the tendency to move it towards a later point in time, as both are approach-related emotions. 
As alternative explanation, Margolies and Crawford (2008) also propose that the statement 
question might be conceptually distinct from the ambiguous time questions and instead might 
tap into “one’s conceptualization of an event in space, regardless of time” (Margolies & 
Crawford, 2008, p. 1405). As we used the original formulation of the ambiguous time 
questions and relied on a neutral event instead of a ‘valenced’ event as was done by Hauser et 
al. (2009) and Margolies and Crawford (2008), our results – the fact that the two measures did 
not correlate significantly – support this later interpretation.  
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This is also, to some extent, supported by results of Richmond et al. (2012) who found 
that the relation between the two questions was just above significance level and found 
discrepancies between the two measures and how they were related to other constructs and 
effected by their emotion-inducing conditions. Moreover, the ambiguous time questions and 
Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement question place very different demands on the 
participants: where the ambiguous time questions asks them to provide an intuitive answer 
about an event being rescheduled to a certain day, Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement 
question forces participants to make a very conscious decision between the ego- and time-
moving representation. As participants are usually unaware of these two time representations, 
they might not feel strongly about either one. Future research should carefully consider this 
and determine the extent to which these two measures tap into the same construct and, in case 
they do tap into something slightly different, investigate the extent to which the construct 
gauged by Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement question is related to agency (and 
other constructs). 
 
Study 2 
As language has been found to affect time representation (Bender et al., 2010; Dahl, 1995; Lai 
& Boroditsky, 2013; Rothe-Wulf et al., 2015), we wanted to see whether the relation found in 
Study 1 could also be observed amongst speakers of a different language. Ergo, we replicated 
Study 1 amongst Dutch participants. It should be pointed out here that we recruited 
participants from the Netherlands; the Dutch spoken by our participants is thus Netherlandic 
Dutch, which is different from, for example, the Dutch spoken in Belgium (Colleman, 2010; 
Halteren & Oostdijk, 2018; Vandekerckhove, 2005; Yselinck & Colleman, 2016). Even 
though we have no evidence to suggest that time representation amongst Netherlandic Dutch 
participants is different from time representation amongst other Dutch-speaking participants 
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(e.g., Belgian Dutch participants) the results and conclusions reported here are limited to 
Netherlandic Dutch (although see Loermans and Milfont (2018) for time representation 
amongst English speakers from New Zealand that suggests that the distribution in responses 
might be somewhat different from the distribution typically observed amongst English 
speakers in the US or UK).  
As mentioned before, a Dutch-speaking sample was used because previous research 
suggests that both the ego-moving and time-moving representation are used by Dutch 
speakers and that the ambiguous time question is in fact ambiguous to them as indicated by an 
occurrence of both ego-moving and time-moving responses (Elvevåg et al., 2011). 
Nonetheless, two pilot studies were conducted to further explore time representation and their 
measurement in Dutch participants. In a first pilot study, we investigated the effect of spatial 
priming on time representation questions.2 In the second pilot study, we investigated the effect 
of the language in which the time representation questions were formulated (Dutch vs. 
English) on the answers to the time representation questions.3 
  
Methods 
Participants and Design. One-hundred and twenty-two university students (48 males; 74 
females) with an average age of 20.57 years (SDage = 4.89) participated in this study, which 
was conducted in the behavioral lab of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The majority of 
participants (82.8%) identified as having Dutch heritage. Only the 99 participants (81.1%) 
who indicated Dutch as their (sole) mother tongue were retained for analyses. An additional 
two participants were excluded from the analyses, as they did not complete the 
autobiographical recall task used to induce either high or low personal agency. Participants, 
on average, took about 20 minutes to complete the entire study and were awarded partial 
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course credits or monetary compensation in exchange for their participation. They were 
randomly assigned to either the high personal agency or low personal agency condition.  
 
Materials and Procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to the materials and 
procedure of Study 1 with two exceptions: 1) all materials were translated to Dutch, and 2) 
participants completed the study in the lab as opposed to completing it online. The Dutch 
formulation of the time representations questions can be found in the appendix. 
 
Results 
We then looked at the responses participants gave to the time representation questions. In 
regards to the ambiguous time questions, six participants (6.2%) provided inconsistent 
answers (an ego-moving answer to one ambiguous time question and a time-moving answer 
to the other ambiguous time question) or incorrect answers (e.g. Saturday). As it is not clear 
which representation these six participants used, they were excluded from further analyses. 
One participant (1%) specifically commented on the ambiguous nature of the time questions 
and was also excluded from the analyses. A minority of participants (13.4%) provided an ego-
moving consistent answer (Friday or 02:00 p.m.) in response to both ambiguous time 
questions, whilst a majority (79.4%) provided a time-moving consistent answer (Monday or 
10:00 a.m.). In regards to statement (2008) question, a slight minority (43.3%) chose the ego-
moving statement (I am approaching the meeting), whilst a slight majority (56.7%) chose the 
time-moving statement (The meeting is approaching). A chi-square analysis revealed that 
answers to the ambiguous time questions and Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement 
question were not significantly related, Χ2 (1, N = 90) = .147, p = .770. 
We examined the effect of agency on the two ambiguous time questions using a chi-
square analysis. This chi-square analysis revealed that participants in the high personal 
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agency condition, compared to participants in the low personal agency condition, were more 
likely to provide a time-moving consistent answer than an ego-moving consistent answer, 
although this effect was just above conventional significance level, Χ2 (1, N = 90) = 3.781, p = 
.071 (see Table 3).  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 
---------------------------- 
We then analyzed the responses to Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement 
question. A chi-square analysis revealed a non-significant effect of agency on the statement 
chosen: participants in the high personal agency condition, compared to participants in the 
low personal agency condition, were not significantly more likely to choose the ego-moving 
statement (I am approaching the meeting) over the time-moving statement (The meeting is 
approaching), Χ2 (1, N = 90) = .326, p = .670 (see Table 4). 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 
---------------------------- 
Again, we ran Bayesian analyses in order to report Bayes factors using the statistical 
software JASP. Bayesian Contingency Tables Tests showed that in regards to the ambiguous 
time questions, the BF10 was 1.14, indicating that the data we observed were 1.14 more likely 
under the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis; in regards to Margolies and 
Crawford's (2008) statement question, the BF01 was 10.45, indicating that the data were 10.45 
more likely under the null hypothesis than the alternative hypothesis.   
 
Discussion 
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Study 2 showed that amongst Dutch participants, feelings of personal agency do not lead to 
the adoption of an ego-moving representation as opposed to a time-moving representation 
when time representation is gauged by the ambiguous time question. Rather, the results 
showed a non-significant effect in the opposite direction suggesting that for Dutch 
participants, feelings of personal agency, may even lead to the adoption of a time-moving 
representation. The Bayes Factor indicates however, that we should be careful in favoring the 
interpretation that feeling of personal agency lead to the adoption of a time-moving 
representation amongst Dutch participants, seeing how our data are almost as likely under the 
null than the alternative hypothesis. In addition, we found no proof for a relation between 
agency and time representation when measuring time representation using Margolies and 
Crawford’s (2008) statement question. Like in Study 1, we did not find that the two measures 
were significantly related in a Dutch sample either, again suggesting that these measures 
might tap into somewhat different constructs (Margolies & Crawford, 2008) 
Our findings regarding the ambiguous time question stand in contrast to our own 
findings from Study 1 and previous correlational findings on the relation between agency and 
time representation (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Richmond et al., 2012). They thereby seem to 
suggest that the relation between agency and time representation might be linguistically or 
culturally idiosyncratic. When considering the possible reasons for this idiosyncrasy it is of 
interest to note that, when looking at the distribution of answers in response to the time 
questions, our data suggest a preference for the time-moving representation amongst 
(Netherlandic) Dutch speaking participants. This preference is particularly pronounced when 
only taking into consideration the answers in response to the ambiguous time questions. Is it 
perhaps possible that the preference for one representation over the other within a speech 
community affects the way it relates to constructs like agency?  
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Based on the findings of the previous two studies this question cannot be answered. 
Although our finding regarding the (Netherlandic) Dutch preference for the time-moving 
representation obviously diverges from the findings of Elvevåg et al. (2011) – who observed a 
more equal distribution of ego-moving and time-moving answers in response to the 
ambiguous time question when using verplaatst as a translation of moving – their study 
involved a small, partially clinical, sample of (Belgian) Dutch speaking participants. 
Moreover, in Study 2 and in Elvevåg et al.'s (2011) study a manipulation of some sort 
preceded the ambiguous time questions. In our study we manipulated agency before asking 
about time representation whereas Elvevåg et al. (2011) replicated McGlone and Harding's 
(1998) second study and presented participants with ambiguous time questions after being 
primed with either the ego-moving or time-moving representation through the presentation of 
unambiguous sentences. This makes it more difficult to make definitive claims about the 
Dutch preference for either one of the time representations at this point as gauged by the 
ambiguous time questions. We therefore decided to follow-up with another study, amongst 
Dutch participants, wherein we simply measured agency and time representation, enabling us 
to examine the occurrence of time representation amongst Dutch participants as well as its 
relation to agency.  
 
Study 3 
In Study 3, we examined the relation between agency and time representation by more closely 
following Richmond et al.'s (2012) research design and taking advantage of the fact that 
individuals differ in terms of the degree that they think they control their own lives. Using a 
non-experimental design does not only make our study more comparable to previous studies 
examining the relation between agency and time representation, it also provides a more 
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unbiased indication of which time representation (Netherlandic) Dutch participants adopt 
when being asked an ambiguous time question. 
  
Methods 
Participants. Two-hundred-and-thirteen university students (95 males; 118 females) with an 
average age of 20.30 years (SDage = 3.45) participated in this study conducted in the 
behavioral lab of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The majority of participants (77.8%) 
identified as having Dutch heritage only. Due to a technical error participant’s mother tongue 
was not recorded, we therefore decided to look to heritage as a proxy for mother tongue and 
only retain participants who identified as having Dutch heritage only (N = 164). Participants, 
on average, took about 21 minutes to complete the study and were awarded partial course 
credits or monetary compensation in exchange for their participation.  
 
Materials and Procedure. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were given an explanation 
about the study before being asked to sign the informed consent form. Participants completed 
the entire study in a private cubicle on the computer. Our measures were included as part of a 
larger test battery.  
To gauge agency, participants completed the Levenson’s Locus of Control 
questionnaire (Levenson, 1972, 1973; Presson, Clark, & Benassi, 2001). This questionnaire 
taps into individual differences regarding the amount of control one perceives over one’s own 
life, is widely used in research, and has been validated across several studies (Abdallah, 1989; 
Brosschot, Gebhardt, & Godaert, 1994; Kennedy, Lynch, & Schwab, 1998; Kourmousi, 
Xythali, & Koutras, 2015; Roddenberry, 2007). The questionnaire consists of 24 items 
belonging to three subscales: internal (e.g., “I can pretty much determine what will happen in 
my life”), powerful others (e.g., “I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by 
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other people”), and chance (e.g., “To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental 
happenings”). Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree and 6 = 
completely agree). We used the Dutch version translated and validated by Brosschot, 
Gebhardt, and Godaert (1994). Subscale scores were computed by averaging over items.  
To gauge time representation, we used one of the ambiguous time questions also used 
in Study 1 and Study 2: Next week’s Wednesday meeting was moved forward by two days. On 
which day is the meeting now? 
Participants filled in demographic information before being debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.  
 
Results 
We first looked at the responses participants gave to the ambiguous time question. A minority 
of participants (23.8%) provided an ego-moving consistent answer (Friday) in response to the 
ambiguous time question, whilst a majority (73.8%) provided a time-moving consistent 
answer (Monday). Four participants (2.4%) provided incorrect answers (e.g. Saturday) and 
were excluded from further analyses.  
Following Richmond et al. (2012), we conducted a series of t-tests to examine whether 
participant’s answers to the ambiguous time question were related to agency as gauged by the 
Levenson’s Locus of Control questionnaire. As can be observed in Table 5, participants with 
an ego-moving representation did not score significantly higher on the internal locus of 
control dimension, and not significantly lower on the powerful others and chance dimensions.    
We ran the same t-tests using the statistical software JASP in order to report Bayes 
factors. As can be observed in Table 5, all BF01 values indicate that the data we observed were 
more likely under the null hypothesis than the alternative hypothesis, although it should be 
noted that in regards to the internal locus of control dimension, the BF01 does not reach the 
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threshold of 3 and our data thus only provide ‘anecdotal’ evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014).   
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 
---------------------------- 
In light of the increasing emphasis placed on replication efforts (Pashler & Harris, 
2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) and to add to the validity of our findings, we conducted 
a replication of this study with a few minor modifications. The results confirm the results 
obtained in Study 2 and Study 3 in suggesting that amongst Dutch participants a high level of 
personal agency does not lead to the adoption of an ego-moving representation.3 
 
Discussion 
In Study 3, we found no proof that feelings of personal agency are related to the ego-moving 
representation amongst Dutch participants. This is in line with our findings from Study 2, but 
diverges from Richmond et al.'s (2012) findings obtained amongst English-speaking 
participants. In addition, the distribution of responses to the ambiguous time question in Study 
3 mirrors the distribution of responses to the ambiguous time question in Study 2, and clearly 
suggests a (Netherlandic) Dutch preference for the time-moving representation. Such a clear 
preference for one representation over the other in non-English-speaking participants parallels 
other research (Bender et al., 2010; Dahl, 1995; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Rothe-Wulf et al., 
2015). Of particular interest in this regard is the study by Rothe-Wulf et al. (2015) which 
compared speakers of Swedish, German, and English, all languages closely related to Dutch. 
They report a Swedish preference for the ego-moving representation and a German preference 
for the time-moving representation, as measured by the ambiguous time questions (Rothe-
Wulf et al., 2015). English speakers, like in other studies, were not found to have a clear 
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preference for either the ego- or time-moving representation (Rothe-Wulf et al., 2015). Given 
that Rothe-Wulf et al. (2015) convincingly argued that the verbs used are all equally 
“underspecified” (p. 935), it is highly unlikely that differences between English and other 
languages emerge out of the different meanings of the verb being used.3 Rather it reveals the 
implicitly agreed upon time representation adopted by the speakers of the language (Rothe-
Wulf et al., 2015).   
Similarly, our Dutch translation of the ambiguous time question does not render the 
question unambiguous, that is, direction is not specified in the naar voren verplaatst 
formulation. This is also supported by the fact a small proportion of participants did choose 
the ego-moving interpretation. The fact that opposite preferences are found in closely related 
languages such as Swedish and German (and Dutch) highlights that convention amongst 
speakers of the speech community in using a certain time representation is arbitrary – in the 
sense that it is not passed along jointly from the common ancestral language to these daughter 
languages (Rothe-Wulf et al., 2015) – but nevertheless a powerful driver in shaping time 
representation. Our findings extend this, as they suggest that convention amongst speakers 
may affect the way time representations are related to such constructs as agency, with 
relations between time representation and agency perhaps only being possible if convention 
provides the possibility of adopting either the ego-moving or time-moving representation. The 
data from our first pilot study also support this assertion as the data indicates that spatial 
primes do not affect responses to the ambiguous time questions as robustly as has been 
previously reported for English participants.2 
 
General Discussion 
The present research investigated the relation between agency and time representation 
amongst English and Dutch speakers. Specifically, in both groups of speakers we tested 
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whether feelings of personal agency lead to the adoption of an ego-moving representation, as 
opposed to a time-moving representation. Additionally, we investigated whether Dutch 
participants naturally adopting an ego-moving representation, as opposed to a time-moving 
representation, reported higher personal agency. Our results paint a heterogeneous picture: 
where inducing feelings of personal agency does lead to the adoption of an ego-moving 
representation in English participants (Study 1), almost the opposite pattern was observed 
amongst speakers of Dutch (Study 2). Moreover, no proof for a correlational relation between 
the ego-moving representation and high personal agency could be found in speakers of Dutch 
(Study 3). Our findings contribute to the literature in two ways.  
First, our research moves beyond previous correlational research on agency and time 
representation (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Richmond et al., 2012) by using an experimental 
design in which we manipulated agency between participants. Our findings from this 
experimental work provide a first insight into how agency and time representation might be 
causally related. Future research can build on this, for example, by investigating whether the 
reverse relation – so whether the adoption of an ego-moving/time-moving also 
increases/decreases feelings of personal agency – also holds. This is plausible considering that 
reciprocal relations have also been found between other psychological constructs such as 
anger and time representation (Hauser et al., 2009). Such a causal link between agency and 
time representation might be of interest to either advertisers or clinicians who may want to 
affect feelings of personal agency in people.  
Second, by investigating the relation between agency and time representation in a 
Dutch population, by manipulating agency and measuring it directly, we accentuate the 
possible role language plays in shaping cognition, a contested notion investigated extensively 
(especially in research on time representation) by linguists and psychologists alike (Au, 1983; 
Boroditsky, 2001; Boroditsky et al., 2011; Casasanto, 2008; Fausey & Boroditsky, 2010, 
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2011; Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010; Guiora, Beit-Hallahmi, Fried, & Yoder, 
1982; January & Kako, 2007; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & 
Levinson, 2004). More specifically, the findings of Study 2 and Study 3 seem to suggest that 
amongst Dutch speakers there is no relation between the ego-moving representation and 
personal agency, and conversely between the time-moving representation and lack of personal 
agency. The marginally significant finding in Study 2 even suggests a relation in the opposite 
direction.  
This is consequential considering that the relation between agency and time 
representation in English speakers has been conjectured on inherent differences between the 
ego-moving and time-moving representation that hold true for Dutch speakers as well. 
Namely, in the ego-moving representations the ego is the moving, agentic entity, typically 
taking the subject role in linguistic constructions (e.g., We approach the deadline/Wij naderen 
de deadline), which gets assigned greater agency in both Dutch and English (Henley et al., 
1995; McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Ruscher, 2011; van Dijk, 1988; see also Fausey & 
Boroditsky, 2010, 2011). Conversely, in the time-moving representation, the ego is the 
stationary non-agentic entity, typically being omitted or taking the object role in linguistic 
constructions (e.g., The deadline is approaching (us)/De deadline nadert (ons)).  
Evidently, cultural and/or linguistic differences do not only directly influence the use 
of the ego-moving and time-moving representation to think and talk about time, as was shown 
in previous research (Bender et al., 2010; Dahl, 1995; Lai & Boroditsky, 2013; Rothe-Wulf et 
al., 2015), but affect the way these time representations are related to agency as well. Future 
research will need to determine whether this also extends to other psychological constructs 
implicated in time representation, such as valence, our emotional experience, and duration 
estimations (Boltz & Yum, 2010; Glicksohn & Ron-Avni, 1997; Hauser et al., 2009; 
McGlone & Pfiester, 2009; Richmond et al., 2012; Ruscher, 2011). 
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It should be noted that our study is not the first to implicate cultural and/or linguistic 
differences as (possible) explanation for our findings regarding time representation and some 
other variable. For example, Loermans and Milfont (2018) found that a previously reported 
relation between the ego-moving representation and a future temporal orientation (Richmond 
et al., 2012) could not be replicated amongst participants from New Zealand. Moreover, de la 
Fuente et al. (2014) showed that a culture’s temporal orientation affects whether its 
constituents place the future to the front or to the back of ego. In their research, they followed 
up their cross-cultural comparison with an actual manipulation of temporal orientation 
allowing them to convincingly pinpoint differences related to temporal orientation as the 
cultural difference driving the time representation (de la Fuente et al., 2014). Similarly, a 
large body of research has implicated writing direction as the factor that determines whether 
time is construed as flowing from left-to-right or from right-to-left (Bergen & Chen Lau, 
2012; Casasanto & Bottini, 2014; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 2010; Tversky, Kugelmass, & 
Winter, 1991).  
With the current data, we are not able to say anything conclusive about what linguistic 
and/or cultural differences might drive our observed differences in the way that agency and 
time representation are related in English and Dutch participants. Nevertheless, our data do 
suggest that (Netherlandic) Dutch participants might prefer a time-moving representation, 
whilst English participants have no strong preference for either. This makes convention/ 
preference regarding the ego- or time-moving representation within a speech community a 
possible promising candidate for future research to investigate. 
 Regarding the observed frequencies of ego- and time-moving representations amongst 
Dutch participants, it should be noted that we found inconsistent results across the ambiguous 
time questions and Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement question in Study 2. Whilst 
the ambiguous time question seemed to suggest a strong preference for the time-moving 
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representation over the ego-moving representation, Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) 
statement question seemed to suggest no such strong preference. Moreover, in both Study 1 
and Study 2 the two measures did not correlate. Although the absence of a correlation 
between the two measures amongst English participants goes against earlier findings by 
Richmond et al. (2012) who found a marginally significant relation between the Wednesday 
ambiguous time question and Margolies and Crawford’s (2008) statement question, it favors 
Margolies and Crawford's (2008) interpretation that their statement question does not exactly 
gauge the ego- and time-moving representation like the ambiguous questions do (but rather 
measures something slightly different).  
In any case, research looking towards cultural and/or linguistic differences regarding 
use of the ego-moving and time-moving representation, as possible driver behind other 
effects, would benefit from combining the commonly employed ambiguous time questions 
with additional measures. Employing additional measures, like linguistic analyses of corpora, 
will provide more conclusive answers on the different conventions in adopting one or the 
other representation across different speech communities (see McGlone & Pfiester, 2009, for 
an example and Lai & Boroditsky, 2013, regarding preferences for the ego-moving and time-
moving representation in Mandarin). Future research will hopefully also shed light on how 
these (unconscious) preferences for either the ego- or time-moving representation developed 
so differently in opposing directions in such closely related languages (see Rothe-Wulf et al., 
2015, for a comparison of English, Swedish, and German).  
In conclusion, our study sheds light on the causal role agency plays in determining 
whether English speakers construe time using the ego-moving or time-moving representation. 
It also brings to the fore questions regarding the generalizability of this relation, as proof for 
this relation was not found amongst Dutch participants. In discussing these results, the role 
convention might play in favoring certain time representations over others, thereby not 
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allowing them to be differentially linked to other constructs such as agency in ways that 
reveal the inherent differences between the ego- and time-moving representations, is 
considered. In doing so, we hope this research serves as a valuable impetus for future research 
examining cross-linguistic variation in time representation and broader issues regarding the 
interplay between language, cognition, emotions, and behavior.  
 
Appendix 
Dutch Formulations of the Time Representation Questions 
The time representation questions were translated to Dutch by the authors and are given 
below. We used naar voren verplaatst as a translation for moved forward in the ambiguous 
time questions (Question 1 and Question 2) instead of, for example, vervroegd or 
teruggeschoven, not only because it is the most direct translation but also because Elvevåg, 
Helsen, De Hert, Sweers, and Storms (2011) found that this formulation ‘made’ the question 
ambiguous in Dutch, as evidenced by both ego- and time-moving answers in response to the 
ambiguous time question using this formulation.  
 
1. De vergadering van morgen 12 uur is twee uur naar voren verplaatst. Hoe laat begint 
de vergadering nu? 
(Tomorrow’s 12 ‘o clock meeting has been moved forward by two hours. What time 
will the meeting start now that it has been rescheduled?) 
2. De vergadering van volgende week woensdag is twee dagen naar voren verplaatst. Op 
welke dag vindt de vergadering nu plaats?  
(Next week Wednesday’s meeting was moved forward by two days. What day is the 
meeting now that it has been rescheduled?) 
3. Welke uitdrukking beschrijft het beste hoe je je voelt? 
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a) Ik nader de vergadering. 
b) De vergadering nadert mij. 
(Which statement best expresses how you feel? a) I approach the meeting. b) The 
meeting is approaching me.) 
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Notes  
1. Data associated with this article can be accessed at https://osf.io/u4w9t/. 
2. The first pilot study replicated the first study by Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) 
amongst Dutch speaking participants. Participants answered a time representation 
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question after receiving either an ego-moving spatial prime or a time-moving spatial 
prime. A significant effect of the spatial prime in the expected direction was observed 
on two of the time representation questions. On request, the authors can provide the 
full details and more information on the results of this pilot study. 
3. In the second pilot study, Dutch-native speakers answered one of the three time 
representation question also used in Study 1 and Study 2 in either Dutch or English 
(see Lai & Boroditsky, 2013, for a similar study using Mandarin-English bilinguals). 
A significant effect of language was observed across the three questions. When asked 
in English, participants were more likely to provide an ego-moving consistent answer 
than when asked in Dutch. On request, the authors can provide the full details and 
more information on the results of this pilot study. 
4. On request, the authors can provide the full details of the replication study.  
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